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ABSTRACT 
Over the past few decades obesity has become one of the largest public policy concerns 
among the adult population in the developed world. Obesity and overweight are 
hypothesized to affect individuals’ sociability through a number of channels, including 
discrimination and low self-esteem. However, whether these effects translate into differential 
behavioural patterns in social interactions remains unknown. In two large-scale economic 
experiments, we explore the relationship between Body Mass Index (BMI) and social 
behaviour, using three paradigmatic economic games: the dictator, ultimatum, and trust 
games. Our first experiment employs a representative sample of a Spanish city's population 
(N=753), while the second employs a sample of university students from the same city 
(N=618). Measures of altruism, fairness/equality, trust and reciprocity are obtained from 
participants’ experimental decisions. Using a variety of regression specifications and control 
variables, our results suggest that BMI does not exert an effect on any of these social 
preferences. Some implications of these findings are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Obesity is increasingly becoming one of the greatest public health challenges in the 
21st century. Moreover, nowadays the relevance of obesity goes far beyond the 
boundaries of the medical world and occupies a central place in the everyday life of 
developed societies. A clear picture of this evolution is provided in Figure 1, which 
illustrates how the term ‘obesity’ has rapidly migrated into our daily speech, 
displacing other key health-related terms such as ‘heart attack’. This comparison is 
particularly interesting because ‘heart attack’ showed similar dynamics long time ago 
(in particular, in the 1920’s and early 30’s, in detriment of ‘pneumonia’ or 
‘tuberculosis’). In the figure we plot data from Chronicle  
(http://chronicle.nytlabs.com), a tool for graphing the historical usage of words and 
phrases in New York Times reporting. It can be seen that the number of NYT articles 
in which ‘obesity’ features has dramatically increased from one or two dozen per 
year in the 1960’s to more than 500 in the early 2010’s (representing about 0.02% 
and 0.40% of all NYT articles, respectively), with the biggest boom taking place over 
the last decade. According to this measure, ‘obesity’ has now reached a similar 
popularity to ‘heart attack’ among the general public. 
Based on the latest World Health Organisation estimates (WHO 2014) the number of 
obese people in the world has almost doubled since 1980s. It is reported that, world-
wide, at least 2.8 million people die each year as a consequence of being overweight 
or obese, and an estimated 35.8 million (2.3%) global illnesses are caused by 
obesity or being overweight (WHO 2009). Obesity and overweight lead to adverse 
effects on blood pressure, cholesterol, triglycerides and insulin resistance. Risks of 
type 2 diabetes, coronary heart disease and stroke increase steadily with increasing 
BMI (body mass index), which is a measure of weight relative to height (WHO 2009). 
 Consequently excess weight puts individuals at massive health risk and it places a 
huge financial burden on the governments and healthcare systems across the globe. 
 
 
Apart from these direct effects, BMI has been associated with a large number of 
indirect influences on people’s lives. Many of them have to do with social ties in the 
sense that obesity and overweight affect not only the individual but also the 
relationship with others. Correlates of excess weight include low self-esteem 
(Hesketh et al 2004, Griffith et al 2010) and self-control (Nederkoorn et al 2006, 
Elfhag and Morey 2008), victimization and bulling among youth (Janssen et al 2004, 
Puhl and Luedicke 2012) and in the employment arena (Rothblum et al 1990, 
Cawley 2004, Garcia and Quintana-Domeque 2006, Morris 2006), social stigma 
(Puhl and Latner 2007), shame (Sjöberg et al 2005, Keith et al 2009), poor academic 
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Figure 1. NYT usage of ‘obesity’ and ‘heart attack’ between 1960 and 2012. The 
figure reports absolute usage. According to Chronicle, in relative terms, ‘heart 
attack’ featured in about 0.80% of all articles published in NYT in the 60’s and 
0.40% in the early 2010’s; for ‘obesity’ these values range from less than 0.03% in 
the 60’s to 0.40% in the early 2010’s. 
 
 performance (Taras and Potts‐Datema 2005, Chomitz et al 2009), low income and 
socio-economic status (Sobal and Stunkard 1989, Zhang and Wang 2004, Cohen et 
al 2006, Garcia and Quintana-Domeque 2009, Scharoun-Lee et al 2009, Grow et al 
2010), disadvantageous marriage market outcomes (Oreffice and Quintana-
Domeque 2010, Chiappori et al 2012), low physical attractiveness ratings (Oreffice 
and Quintana-Domeque 2015), aggressive behaviour and suicide intentions (Eaton 
et al 2005, Heneghan et al 2012), and problematic adolescence behaviour (Ter Bogt 
et al 2006, McClure et al 2012). In consequence, obesity and overweight do not only 
affect health conditions but also impact individuals’ sociability.  
However, we do not know whether there are more fundamental effects of BMI on 
social behaviour in general. While some results might intuitively suggest less "social" 
behaviour (e.g. aggression, victimization, isolation, discrimination3) or at least lower 
ability to socialise, it is an open question whether these effects translate into less 
pro-social patterns among high BMI individuals. Our paper fills this gap. 
An interesting approach to this issue has been accomplished within the literature on 
personality traits. Indeed, although some findings have been inconsistent across 
studies, recent assessments suggest that excess weight (and/or increases in BMI) 
may be negatively associated with consciousness and agreeableness and positively 
with neuroticism, extraversion and other impulsivity-related traits (e.g. Sutin et al 
2011, Jokela et al 2013, Vainik et al 2015). This indicates that obese individuals may 
be characterised by poor quality of social relationships. However, these results are 
based on survey self-reports thus lacking a direct measurement of individuals’ actual 
behavioural patterns. 
Over the last 30 years there has been a boom in systematic studies of social 
behaviour in controlled lab environments using economic incentives. Behavioural 
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 For instance, Proestakis and Brañas-Garza (2015) show that subjects who consider themselves 
overweight demand less money as a compensation to fill a questionnaire. 
 and experimental economists have developed several economic games to measure 
individual behaviour in a number of areas, such as cooperation, trust, networks, etc. 
These games have been extensively used in theory development and empirical 
inference, not only within economics and the social sciences (e.g. Fehr and Gächter 
2000, Fehr and Fischbacher 2004, Henrich et al 2004, Falk and Heckmann 2009, 
Brañas-Garza et al 2010, 2014a, LeVeck et al 2014), but also among the natural 
sciences (e.g. Nowak et al 2000, Perc and Szolnoki 2008, Rand and Nowak 2011, 
Espín et al 2012, Cuesta et al 2015). 
While previous experimental economics research has studied the relationship of BMI 
to risk (Anderson and Mellor 2008, Galizzi and Miraldo 2010) and time preferences 
(Smith et al 2005, Chabris et al 2008, Epstein et al 2010), there is as yet little 
evidence of a link between BMI and social (other-regarding) preferences. Exploring 
the relationship between people’s BMI and their behaviour in controlled social 
environments is crucial to understanding whether the influence of obesity and 
overweight on sociability-related factors translates into different levels of concern 
among individuals for others’ welfare. In fact several experimental studies have 
shown that social preferences are related to social integration (centrality) in networks 
(Leider et al 2009, Brañas-Garza et al 2010, Kovarik et al 2012). 
Among the social motives in the literature, here we will focus on individuals’ 
preferences for altruism, fairness/equality, trust and reciprocity (see Fehr and 
Schmidt 2006 for a review). Based on data from two large-scale economic 
experiments, this paper tests the hypothesis that these social preferences are 
related to body weight while controlling for potential confounding factors (such as 
socio-demographics, cognitive skills, risk and time preferences). Given the 
prevalence of obesity and overweight in developed societies, the results might be 
informative for understanding behaviour in the workplace, personal relationships and 
social interactions in general.  Moreover, from a dynamic perspective, a statistically 
 significant relationship might suggest that as the population is becoming more 
obese, simultaneously our societies are becoming more or less ‘other-regarding’. 
We analyse two complementary datasets from social preference experiments 
involving real monetary stakes. The first dataset (the ‘city’ experiment) is a 
representative sample of the adult population of a Spanish city while the second one 
(the ‘lab’ experiment) is a lab sample of university students from the same city. The 
use of these two datasets strengthens the validity of our results. Furthermore, the 
procedures used in both experiments (see Methods) minimise potential self-selection 
problems (Exadaktylos et al 2013) and experimenter demand effects (Zizzo 2010), 
which may be particularly important in studying the connection between BMI and 
social behaviour.  
 
2. Methods 
The city experiment took place between November and December 2010 in the city of 
Granada, Spain, with a representative sample of 835 citizens between 16 and 89 
years old (as shown in section S7 of the supplementary materials of Exadaktylos et 
al 2013, the sample was representative of the city in terms of geographical situation 
of households and of age and gender of participants). All subjects played the 
experimental games in their own homes supervised by monitors (108 pairs of senior 
university students acted as interviewers). The lab experiment was conducted in the 
Granada Lab of Experimental Economics (GLoBE-EGEO) at the University of 
Granada during October 2011. Across 27 sessions of 20 to 30 subjects data were 
collected from a sample of 659 first year undergraduate students. Further information 
on the procedures used for the city and lab experiments can be found in Exadaktylos 
et al (2013) and Brañas-Garza et al (2014b), respectively. 
 In both studies, subjects completed the exact same survey/experiment. After an 
identical questionnaire, each participant made five experimental decisions with real 
monetary incentives. Our experimental design consists of three canonical two-player 
games: Dictator Game (DG), Ultimatum Game (UG) and Trust Game (TG). 
Decisions were made in random order and all participants played both roles of each 
game. For each decision, participants would be matched with a different anonymous 
participant selected at random. One out of every ten participants was randomly 
selected for real payment. In order to preserve independence between decisions, 
participants were instructed that they would be paid for real according to only one 
randomly selected role. 
In the DG (Forsythe et al 1994), participants had to split an amount of €20 between 
themselves and another anonymous participant. Subjects decided which share of the 
€20 they wanted to transfer to the other participant (in €2 increments).  
Similarly, in the UG (Güth et al 1982), the 1st player (the proposer) had to suggest a 
way to split a €20 pie between him/herself and another anonymous participant by 
making an offer to the 2nd player (the responder). However the implementation was 
upon acceptance of the offer by the randomly matched responder. In case of 
rejection neither participant earned anything. For the role of the responder in the UG 
we used the strategy method in which subjects have to state in advance their 
willingness to accept or reject each of the possible proposals (Mitzkewitz and Nagel 
1993). The responder’s Minimum Acceptable Offer (MAO) is the minimum amount of 
money that the subject would accept (Figure 2, left panel) and will be our measure 
for responder behaviour. 
In the TG (a strategy-method, binary version developed by Ermisch et al 2009), the 
trustor (1st player) had to decide whether to pass €10 or €0 to the trustee 
(2nd player). In case of passing €0, the trustor earned €10 and the trustee nothing. If 
 she passed €10, the trustee would receive €40 instead of €10 (money was being 
quadrupled). The trustee, conditional on the trustor having passed the money had to 
decide whether to send back €22 and keep €18 for him/herself or keep all €40 
without sending anything back, in which case the trustor did not earn anything 
(Figure 2, right panel). 
         
 
As mentioned earlier, each of these decisions is associated with a different social 
preference. While the DG measures altruism, the 1st player’s decision in the UG 
measures strategic altruism insofar as generous offers can stem from the fear of 
rejection. The 2nd UG player captures sense of self-centred fairness. (Note that 
under the umbrella of “self-centred fairness” we include negative reciprocity and the 
two forms of envy most commonly used to explain responder behaviour from an 
outcome-based viewpoint, i.e. inequality-aversion and spite-based envy (Fehr and 
 
 
Figure 2. Ultimatum (left) and Trust (right) Games in strategic form. The figure shows 
the payoffs (in €) associated to each of the possible outcomes of the games for first 
and second movers, respectively. 
 
 Schmidt 2006 and Brañas-Garza et al 2014b). In the TG, the 1st player’s decisions 
are driven by trust whereas the 2nd player’s choices reflect positive reciprocity.  
At the beginning of both experiments participants received some general information 
about the nature of the experimental economic games according to standard 
procedures. In particular, participants were informed that: 
 The five decisions involved real monetary payoffs coming from a national 
research project endowed with a specific budget for this purpose. 
 The monetary outcome would depend only on the participant's decision or on 
both his/her own and another randomly matched participant's decision, whose 
identity would forever remain anonymous. 
 One of every ten participants would be randomly selected to be paid, and the 
exact payoff would be determined by a randomly selected role.  
Both experiments applied procedures that ensured absolute double-blind anonymity. 
Thus, participants' decisions would remain forever blind in the eyes of the 
interviewers, the researchers, and the randomly matched participant. In the city 
experiment, once the general instructions had been given, the interviewer read the 
details for each experimental decision separately. After every instruction set 
participants were asked to write their decisions privately in a decision card and 
proceed to the next task. Once all the five decisions were made, participants 
introduced their decision card in an envelope and sealed it4. However, in the lab 
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 As one of the referees pointed out a critical issue is whether subjects in the field understood the 
experimental rules. Although the interviewers were instructed to ensure that participants understood 
the instructions before making their decisions, this is still a valid concern. To address this issue we 
check the existence of multiple switching on UG responder choice (i.e. accept an offer and reject a 
higher one), which is the most difficult of the five decisions. Multiple switching prevents obtaining a 
reliable MAO and indicates that the individual misunderstood the game instructions. Among those 
who completed the whole survey in the city sample (809), 778 were able to report a reliable MAO, 
representing 96% of cases. In the lab sample, this percentage is 98%. We consider that this gives us 
a valuable indication that most participants, more so those included in the analyses due to having 
 experiment these steps were taken on the computers as students received their 
instructions on their screens. In both experiments, to control for possible order 
effects on decisions, the sequence both between and within games was randomized 
across participants, resulting in 24 different orders (always setting aside the two 
decisions of the same game). The average earnings among winners, including those 
winning €0 (18.75% in the city and 11.43% in the lab), were €9.60 and €10.43 for the 
city and lab experiments, respectively.  
In the city experiment subjects did not know about the experimental nature of the 
study before accepting to participate. It was only after completing the first seven 
survey blocks that they were informed of the content of the experimental decisions. 
This procedure, added to the fact that participants did not have to move to the lab, 
reduced the scope for self-selection bias to influence the results (see Exadaktylos et 
al 2013). In the lab experiment students were invited to visit the lab by the Dean of 
the School of Economics, so that they did not attend to earn money but to see the 
lab, thus also reducing potential self-selection problems – more than 70% of all 
registered students participated in this activity – (Abeler and Nosenzo 2014). Once 
students were placed in their respective cubicles (which impeded visual contact 
between them) they were invited to complete the survey and play the experimental 
games on the computers: no one refused.  
In the questionnaire, along with other extensive information on socio-demographic, 
psychological and personality variables, participants were asked to self-report their 
weight and height. Participants’ BMI was calculated using the following standard 
formula:  BMI = Weight(kg)/Height(m)2. It must be noted that there is an obvious 
issue concerning self-reported measures of weight and height: self-reports may not 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
reliable values, understood correctly the instructions. In addition, note that in the main regressions we 
control for cognitive skills, which serves as a proxy for the participants' level of understanding. 
 
 provide the true picture of individuals’ actual BMI figures. Indeed, the clinical 
literature generally agrees that self-reported data is inappropriate for precise 
measures of obesity prevalence (Kuczmarski et al 2001, Brener et al 2003, 
McAdams et al 2007). However, self-reported and measured BMI values are highly 
correlated (r ≈ 0.90; e.g. Spencer et al 2002) and self-reports are considered valid for 
identifying relationships, for instance, in epidemiological research (Huber 2007, 
McAdams et al 2007, Stommel and Schoenborn 2009). Importantly, the combination 
of experimental decisions and a long multifaceted survey minimises potential 
demand effects (Zizzo 2010) in the sense that it is unlikely that participants make a 
conscious or unconscious link between their answers to particular survey questions 
(in this case, weight and height) and behaviour in the games.  
 
3. Results  
3.1 The Data  
The lab sample shows smaller mean and variance in the distribution of BMI than the 
city sample. This means that, as expected, the lab data does not describe accurately 
the real BMI distribution of the adult population. University students are on average 
younger and considered to be more physically active than the representative 
population, thus have lower average BMI levels. This results in the lab BMI 
distribution being skewed to the left (Figure 3). Two-tailed t-tests (assuming equal 
variances and not) comparing the means of the city (x̄c) and lab BMI distributions (x̄l) 
reject the null hypothesis of equal means (p<0.001). (Table A1 in Appendix shows 
that normality is rejected for both the lab and the city samples.) 
However, the advantage of the lab experiment is that it adds control. Control is the 
main characteristic of lab experiments since in the field it is almost impossible to 
have the same level of supervision of procedures and execution. Experiments run in 
 the field are typically richer in terms of variability, representativeness, etc. but lack 
the precision and credibility that the results obtained under lab conditions provide. 
Put differently, while the field prioritises external over internal validity of results, the 
opposite pattern holds for lab experiments (e.g. Loewenstein 1999, Harrison and List 
2004). 
Besides adding control, the lab dataset provides another important advantage. In our 
lab sample the average age is 19.05, with most observations being concentrated 
around that value (SD=2.17). In contrast, in the city sample the average age is 37.46 
and there is high variation (SD=16.97). In sum, our two experiments complement 
each other. The use of both samples will thus minimise internal and external validity 
concerns and add credibility to the findings.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Now we turn to the descriptive statistics of our data. Note first that from the initial 
samples we excluded those observations with missing values in any of the variables 
used for the statistical analyses (in total 77 in the city sample and 41 in the lab 
sample). According to spearman correlations, in both samples older individuals and 
individuals with lower cognitive skills are more likely to be excluded for this reason 
(ps<0.01 in the city and ps<0.1 in the lab) as are married individuals (p=0.011) in the 
city and males (p=0.055) in the lab; higher BMI is marginally associated with the 
likelihood of being excluded in the city sample (p=0.070). In addition, the standard 
‘mean±3*SD’ rule for detecting BMI outliers excluded 5 extra observations from the 
city sample (no outliers were detected in the lab experiment). This procedure leads 
to final sample sizes of 753 and 618 for the city and lab experiments, respectively.  
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Figure 3. Comparison of city and lab BMI. The blue line is representing the 
city sample (N=753) while the brown line is referring to the lab sample 
(N=618). x̄c = 24.23 (3.69) refers to the mean (SD) of the BMI distribution in 
the city sample, x̄l= 21.83 (2.96) refers to the mean (SD) of the BMI 
distribution in the lab sample. 
 
distributions. 
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 Table 1 presents the minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation of the BMI-
related and game-behaviour variables, separately for the city and lab samples. In the 
last column, we show the results of a series of statistical tests comparing both 
samples. As expected, the samples differed significantly in terms of age and BMI, 
but not in gender composition. 
Regarding behaviour in the games, DG offer and UG offer refer to the amount 
(between €0 and €20) transferred to the 2nd player in the dictator and ultimatum 
games, respectively. UG mao refers to the minimum acceptable offer stated by the 
participant when deciding as responder in the ultimatum game (between €0 and 
€10). On the other hand, trustor is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
subject passed the money (€10) to the trustee in the trust game, and 0 if she/he did 
not. Finally, trustee=1 if the subject reciprocated the trustor’s trust (€22, €18), and =0 
otherwise (€0, €40). On average participants’ offers in the DG were marginally higher 
in the lab compared to the city sample, whereas the difference in UG offers did not 
reach statistical significance. Mean UG MAOs were however higher in the city 
sample, that is, the sense of self-centred fairness appears to be stronger among 
ordinary people. Lastly, while there were no differences in TG trustor decisions, the 
lab participants were more likely to reciprocate as trustees than the city participants. 
(See Figure A1 for the distribution of choices in the games, separately for the city 
and lab experiments.) Note that given the recruitment method used, students in the 
lab were “pseudo-volunteers”, who have been previously found to be more pro-social 
than the typical participants in economic experiments (Eckel and Grossman 2000). 
This might have raised the average level of pro-social behaviour observed in our lab 
experiment. Tables A2 and A3 report spearman correlations between the five 
behavioural measures for the city and lab samples, respectively.  
 
 3.2 BMI and social preferences 
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the results of a series of regressions estimating game 
behaviour as a function of BMI and a set of control variables (socio-demographics, 
cognitive skills and economic preferences; see the Appendix for a detailed 
description of the controls used). The full regressions including estimates for all 
control variables are available in Appendix Tables A4 and A5 (for the sake of 
completeness we also display regressions without controls in Tables A6 and A7). 
Five models are presented for each sample: DG and UG offers are the dependent 
variables in models (1) and (2), respectively, which are based in Tobit regressions 
with left and right censoring. Model (3) estimates UG MAOs using OLS. Finally, 
models (4) and (5) are Probit regressions estimating behaviour as TG Trustor and 
Trustee, respectively. The same model specifications are used in Exadaktylos et al 
(2013) and Brañas-Garza et al (2014a). For each of these models we performed two 
regressions in which we explore the linear relationship between BMI and behaviour 
in that game (left column) as well as their quadratic relationship (by adding BMI 
squared, BMIsq, as a regressor; right column).   
Table 2 displays the regression results obtained from the city dataset. It is 
noteworthy that only one significant effect arises across all the ten regressions. A 
non-linear, convex relationship is observed between BMI and UG offers (i.e. strategic 
altruism), but the coefficients are just marginally significant and small in magnitude. 
When controls are excluded (Table A6), this relationship remains similar (note that, 
according to the joint significance Chi2 statistic, the model is no longer significant, so 
that we cannot reject that the coefficients of BMI and BMIsq are jointly equal to zero; 
indeed, the same hypothesis cannot be rejected either in the model with controls of 
Table 2, p=0.15). Also, a marginally significant, positive linear effect of BMI on DG 
offers appears in the model without controls. Given that the coefficient of BMI is 
largely insignificant in the main model estimating DG offers (p=0.81, Table 2), we 
 can infer that the relationship observed in Table A6 is spurious and driven by other 
control variables with which BMI is correlated. All the remaining estimates of either 
BMI or BMIsq are far from significant (ps>0.4 in Table 2; ps>0.3 in Table A6).  
A graphical method based on locally weighted regressions (Lowess smoothing) is 
used to identify possible higher-order polynomial relationships or more complex 
patterns (without accounting for the control variables though). Figure 4 displays the 
results: no clear pattern is observed beyond what we have already mentioned. One 
might wonder whether the width of the age range analysed in the city sample 
(between 16 and 89 years old) could help to blur the effect of BMI on social 
behaviour. To alleviate this concern we performed the same regressions restricting 
the sample to individuals between 20 and 50 years old (as suggested by a reviewer, 
this would limit the possible role of height growth before the 20’s, and height 
shrinkage after the 50’s). In these regressions (n=511), we do not find any significant 
result (even the marginally significant non-linear effect found for UG offers turns 
insignificant, all ps>0.16; these analyses are available upon request from the 
authors). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 3 presents the same regression models for the lab sample. Here, none of the 
linear or non-linear effects of BMI are significant (models without control variables do 
not report any significant estimate either; see Table A7). The only effect that is close 
to significance is that (linear) on TG trustee (p=0.11 in Table 3; p=0.17 in Table A7). 
All the remaining coefficients are largely insignificant again (ps>0.3 in Table 3; 
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Figure 4. Lowess smoothing: Game behaviour as a function of BMI (city sample) 
 
 ps>0.4 in Table A7). Lowess smoothing supports these null results; more complex 
patterns are neither observed (see Figure 5). Also note that the results are 
qualitatively similar if we exclude participants older than 26 (8 observations, who are 
age outliers according to the ‘mean±3*SD’ rule): the smaller p-value we obtain is 
0.16 (available upon request from the authors). 
  
It is also important to note that over half of the city and lab samples chose to offer 10 
or more in the DG and UG. We converted DG and UG offers into a binary variable 
(1=10 or more, and 0=<10) and repeated the regressions (using probit models 
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Figure 5. Lowess smoothing: Game behaviour as a function of BMI (lab sample) 
 
 instead of tobit) of Tables 2 and 3 for both DG and UG offers. In these regressions 
the p-values of BMI and BMIsq are even higher in both samples (all ps>0.44) 
compared to the original regressions in Tables 2 and 3 (these analyses are also 
available upon request).  
All in all, the most salient result from these two sets of regressions is the lack of 
significant results. Although one marginally significant non-linear effect of BMI on 
strategic altruism is observed in the city dataset, it is economically small and not 
robust to different specifications. We also analysed the interaction of BMI with the 
basic demographic controls in order to test whether the (non) effects of BMI on game 
behaviour differ across genders or age groups. None of the interactions yield 
significant estimates in either sample (ps>0.25 in the city sample and ps>0.19 in the 
lab sample; available upon request). We can therefore conclude that, across the two 
samples under scrutiny, preferences for altruism, fairness, trust or reciprocity are 
basically unrelated to BMI. 
As robustness check, we conducted two extra exercises. First, in Tables A8 and A9 
we performed the same regressions but, instead of using BMI as a continuous 
explanatory variable, we defined dummy variables for overweight (25≤BMI<30) and 
obesity (BMI≥30). Second, for the models presented in Tables A10 and A11 we 
substituted BMI for an index of body fat percentage, the CUN-BAE, recently 
developed by Gómez-Ambrosi et al (2012). The conclusions drawn from these 
regressions are qualitatively the same: some marginally significant effects arise but 
none of them are robust. In particular, obese individuals were less likely to 
reciprocate as TG trustees in the city but not in the lab sample. Estimated body fat 
percentage (CUN-BAE) shows a non-linear, convex relationship with UG MAOs in 
the city but not in the lab sample, while a similar effect is observed on trustee 
choices in the lab but not in the city (in both cases, however, either the linear or the 
quadratic terms are not significant). Yet, the p-values are all greater than 0.09. 
 4. Discussion 
Using data obtained from two large-scale experiments, we examined whether 
participants’ BMI is associated with social behaviour in economic games. Previous 
studies have established that obesity and overweight status affect some aspects of 
sociality (e.g. Janssen et al 2004, Eaton et al 2005, Sjöberg et al 2005) and covary 
with several personality traits which are also known to influence individuals’ social 
relationships (Sutin et al 2011, Jokela et al 2013, Vainik et al 2015). However, we do 
not find support for the hypothesis that these effects translate into differential social 
preferences. To be more specific, we do not find evidence that in general altruism, 
fairness, trust, or reciprocity are associated with BMI in either a representative or a 
student sample. Neither linear nor non-linear systematic effects are observed.  
It is therefore tempting to speculate that the massive variation in BMI toward 
increasing obesity rates in the developed world is unlikely to have a direct impact on 
the average levels of social preferences of its citizens. Yet, this issue should studied 
by means of within-individual analyses and is thus an interesting hypothesis to be 
tested in future research using longitudinal data. Given that our results are based on 
two Spanish samples and that this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study 
looking at the relationship between BMI and social preferences, further studies 
should also examine whether these findings can be extended to other 
countries/regions. Indeed, different cultures have different attitudes towards obesity 
and body weight “ideals” (Altabe 1998, Paeratakul et al 2002), and this might 
influence the relationship under study. 
An important issue here is that some of the variables associated with the sociability 
of obese individuals, such as shame or stigmatisation (Sjöberg et al 2005, Puhl and 
Latner 2007, Keith et al 2009), have to do with the perception and/or behaviour of 
others. Our experimental decisions were however made under conditions of 
 anonymity. According to the above, hence, it might be that high-BMI people change 
their social behaviour in the presence of others, or of cues of being watched (in the 
general population, these types of cues have been found to influence, for instance, 
cooperation behaviour; see Bateson et al 2006), or that other individuals display 
differential patterns when they know that their partner is obese (e.g. Liu et al 2013). 
Another potential avenue for experimental research in this area could involve 
subjects who self-select into the experiment. Along these lines, it might interesting to 
explore whether subjects who report their BMI during the recruitment process 
behave differently compared to those who report their BMI during the experiment (so 
that body weight concerns become salient). These are all promising directions for 
future research.    
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
                            City dataset                                     Lab dataset 
Variable Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD p-value 
BMI 16.80 35.55 24.23 3.69 15.35 34.63 21.83 2.93 0.000*** 
gender(male) 0 1 0.46 0.50 0 1 0.42 0.49 0.230 
age 16 89 37.46 16.97 17 42 19.05 2.17 0.000*** 
DG offer 0 20 7.84 4.31 0 20 8.22 3.37 0.074* 
UG offer 0 20 9.31 2.96 0 20 9.52 1.68 0.138 
UG mao 0 10 7.02 3.55 0 10 6.02 3.08 0.000*** 
Trustor 0 1 0.70 0.45 0 1 0.70 0.46 0.766 
Trustee 0 1 0.71 0.45 0 1 0.79 0.41 0.001*** 
 
 
Notes: P-values in the last column correspond to the results of two-tailed tests comparing both samples. T-tests were performed 
in all cases except for gender, trustor and trustee, which were tested using Fisher’s exact test. * p-value< .1 , ** p-value< .05 , 
*** p-value< .01  
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DG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
          
BMI 0.013 -0.015 -0.007 -0.743* -0.005 0.362 -0.008 -0.068 -0.012 0.027 
 
(0.806) (0.978) (0.834) (0.056) (0.913) (0.424) (0.600) (0.650) (0.486) (0.866) 
BMIsq  0.001  0.014*  -0.007  0.001  -0.001 
 
 (0.959)  (0.061)  (0.421)  (0.687)  (0.803) 
constant 6.955*** 7.304 10.782*** 19.662*** 3.379** -1.020 0.642 1.376 0.269 -0.213 
 
(0.002) (0.306) (0.000) (0.000) (0.035) (0.850) (0.265) (0.461) (0.669) (0.919) 
adj/pseudo R
2 
    0.075 0.076 0.041 0.041 0.087 0.087 
log likelihood -2018.881 -2018.880 -1873.157 -1870.862   -435.996 -435.916 -410.844 -410.810 
F/chi
2
 3.06*** 3.09*** 2.00*** 2.10*** 2.18*** 2.11*** 62.98*** 70.60*** 96.99*** 97.44*** 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 753 753 753 753 753 
  
Table 2. City Sample 
Notes: Dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). Robust standard errors are clustered 
on interviewers (108 groups). Controls include gender, age, age squared, marital status, unemployment, household income, household size, educational level, cognitive skills and risk and time 
preferences. All regressions also control for order effects. P-values in parentheses. * p-value< .1 , ** p-value< .05 , *** p-value< .01 
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  DG offer  UG offer  UG mao  Trustor  Trustee  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
        
                  
 
BMI 0.005 -0.16 0.019 0.115 0.033 0.419 -0.012 -0.067 0.036 0.143 
 
(0.927) (0.750) (0.345) (0.506) (0.452) (0.345) (0.529) (0.722) (0.114) (0.461) 
BMIsq  0.004  -0.002  -0.008  0.001  -0.002 
 
 (0.740)  (0.562)  (0.384)  (0.770)  (0.574) 
constant 17.265** 19.115* 9.348*** 8.283** 11.866* 7.583 -1.574 -0.957 5.468 4.401 
  (0.027) (0.053) (0.001) (0.013) (0.076) (0.374) (0.563) (0.780) (0.310) (0.442) 
adj/pseudo R
2
     0.078 0.079 0.046 0.046 0.056 0.057 
log likelihood -1592.178 -1592.126 -1183.893 -1183.810   -359.605 -359.564 -298.628 -298.510 
F/chi
2
 2.15*** 2.10*** 79.03*** 78.19*** 47.91*** 46.49*** 36.96* 37.25 31.75 31.91 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 618 618 618 618 618 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the individual level. Controls include gender, age, age squared, unemployment, household income, household size, cognitive skills and risk and time preferences. All 
regressions also control for order effects. P-values in parentheses. * p-value< .1 , ** p-value< .05 , *** p-value< .01 
 
 
Table 3. Lab sample 
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Appendix 
Variables description 
The definitions of control variables that are not self-explanatory are the following: 
In the regressions using the city sample, marital status groups are compared against 
“single”, which is the omitted category (marital status controls are not included in the 
regressions for the lab sample because virtually all subjects were single); household 
income refers to self-reported net household monthly income and consists of 10 
categories corresponding to €0-€4,500 (in €500 increments); education refers to the 
subject’s educational level and has 9 categories from “did not study at all” to “graduate 
university degree” (in the lab sample, the education variable is not included because its 
value was the same for all subjects); nperhousehold measures the number of 
individuals living in the subject’s household.  
 
Risk 1, risk 2 and risk 3 refer to the subject’s attitudes toward financial risk and are 
dummy variables where 1 means that the subject chose the risky option, and 0 that s/he 
chose the non-risky option. Risk attitudes are controlled for since payments were 
probabilistic and both the UG and the TG involve some strategic risk. The risk questions 
are the following: 
Risk 1: 1 if option b, 0 if option a in the question: “We flip a coin. Choose one of 
the following options: a. Take 1.000 Euros no matter if it is heads or tails; b. Take 
2.000 Euros if it is heads and nothing if it is tails”. 
Risk 2: 1 if option a, 0 if option b in the question: “Choose one of the following 
options: a. Take a lottery ticket with 80% chance of winning 45 Euros and 20% 
chance of winning nothing; b. Take 30 Euros”. 
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Risk 3: 1 if ‘Yes’, 0 if ‘No’ in the question: “Would you accept the following deal? 
We flip a coin. If it is heads you win 1,500 Euros and if it is tails you lose 1,000 
Euros”. 
Note that risk 1 captures “risk-loving” in the domain of gains when both the risky and 
the non-risky option have the same expected value. Risk 2 captures risk-loving in the 
gains domain as well, but in a question where the risky option yields a higher expected 
value than the non-risky one. Finally, risk 3 captures risk loving when the risky option 
involves possible losses. 
 
Impatience corresponds to the number of impatient choices the subject made in an 
inter-temporal choice task and captures preference for sooner-smaller rewards over 
larger but more delayed rewards (see Espín et al 2015 for further details on this survey-
based discounting task). For eliciting impatience, hypothetical rewards were used due 
to logistical reasons and because previous evidence has shown that the use of real (vs. 
hypothetical) incentives does not significantly change the distribution of individual inter-
temporal choices (see, e.g. Johnson and Bickel 2002, Lagorio and Madden 2005). Due 
to their large number, observations with missing values on this variable (subjects who 
made inconsistent choices in the task) are adjusted to the mean in order not to 
disproportionately reduce sample size. The measure of impatience is included as a 
control since the payments of the experiment were delayed, and because impatience 
has been found to affect behaviour in strategic social interactions (Curry et al 2008, 
Espín et al 2012, 2015). In addition, time and risk preferences are considered two key 
dimensions of impulsivity (Reynolds et al 2006), which is thought to be an important 
determinant of eating disorders and obesity (e.g. Nederkoorn et al 2006, Rosval et al 
2006, Epstein et al 2010). 
14 
 
Cogn skills corresponds to the cognitive abilities of a subject measured by the number 
of correct answers to the following five questions:  
1. If the probability of being infected by an illness is 10%, how many persons of a group 
of 1000 would be infected by that kind of illness? (N if s/he cannot/do not want to 
answer). 
2. If there are 5 persons that own the winning lottery ticket and the prize to be shared is 
two million Euros, how much money would each person receive? 
3. Suppose that you have €100 in a savings account and the rate of interest that you 
earn from the savings is 2% per year. If you keep the money in the account for 5 years, 
how much money would you have at the end of these 5 years?: 
a. More than €102 
b. €102 exactly 
c. Less than €102 
d. S/he cannot/ do not want to answer 
4. Suppose that you have €100 in a savings account. The account accumulates a 10% 
rate of interest per year. How much money would you have in your account after two 
years? 
5. The total cost of a bat and a ball is 1.10 Euros. The bat costs 1 Euro more than the 
ball. How many cents does the ball cost? 
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Appendix tables 
 
 
Sample N p(Skewness) p(Kurtosis) adj. chi
2
 p>chi
2
 
City 753 0.000*** 0.680 34.45 0.000*** 
Lab 618 0.000*** 0.000*** 73.47 0.000*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1. BMI skewness/kurtosis tests for normality 
 
Notes: Skewness/kurtosis tests for normality (D’Agostino et al 1990) with correction for overall Chi2 and its 
significance level (Royston 1991). * p-value< .1 , ** p-value< .05 , *** p-value< .01. 
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  DG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor 
     
UG offer 0.335*** 
   
 
(0.000) 
   
UG mao 0.034 0.114*** 
  
 
(0.395) (0.005) 
  
Trustor 0.064 0.017 -0.077* 
 
 
(0.112) (0.669) (0.056) 
 
Trustee 0.229*** 0.121*** -0.018 0.160*** 
  (0.000) (0.003) (0.664) (0.000) 
 
 
 
DG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor 
          UG offer 0.409*** 
   
 
(0.000) 
   
UG mao 0.053 0.080** 
  
 
(0.145) (0.028) 
  
Trustor 0.136*** 0.123*** -0.001 
 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.970) 
 
Trustee 0.303*** 0.211*** -0.048 0.306*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.187) (0.000) 
Table A2. Spearman correlations between social 
preference measures (city sample; N=753) 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. * p-value< .1 , ** p-value< .05 , *** p-
value< .01 
Table A3. Spearman correlations between social 
preference measures (lab sample; N=618) 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. * p-value< .1 , ** p-value< .05 , 
*** p-value< .01 
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DG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
           BMI 0.013 -0.015 -0.007 -0.743* -0.005 0.362 -0.008 -0.068 -0.012 0.027 
 
(0.806) (0.978) (0.834) (0.056) (0.913) (0.424) (0.600) (0.650) (0.486) (0.866) 
BMIsq 
 
0.001 
 
0.014* 
 
-0.007 
 
0.001 
 
-0.001 
  
(0.959) 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.421) 
 
(0.687) 
 
(0.803) 
gender(male) -0.455 -0.450 0.038 0.157 -0.200 -0.260 -0.090 -0.080 0.077 0.070 
 
(0.272) (0.271) (0.875) (0.518) (0.422) (0.340) (0.353) (0.425) (0.505) (0.547) 
age 0.006 0.006 -0.026 -0.018 0.125*** 0.122*** 0.005 0.006 0.011 0.010 
 
(0.944) (0.941) (0.625) (0.728) (0.003) (0.004) (0.788) (0.765) (0.605) (0.625) 
agesq 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.995) (0.992) (0.660) (0.756) (0.010) (0.013) (0.758) (0.736) (0.865) (0.887) 
married 1.067 1.067 0.292 0.313 -1.340*** -1.351*** 0.254 0.255 0.112 0.112 
 
(0.119) (0.118) (0.464) (0.426) (0.006) (0.006) (0.124) (0.122) (0.554) (0.556) 
divorced 2.105*** 2.104*** 0.237 0.230 -0.972 -0.969 -0.073 -0.075 0.245 0.246 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.744) (0.749) (0.228) (0.231) (0.793) (0.787) (0.429) (0.428) 
widow -0.081 -0.077 0.215 0.329 0.448 0.390 0.209 0.218 0.425 0.418 
 
(0.941) (0.943) (0.735) (0.599) (0.546) (0.605) (0.472) (0.452) (0.258) (0.272) 
cohabiting -0.130 -0.128 -0.847* -0.801* -0.530 -0.553 0.473* 0.476* -0.232 -0.235 
 
(0.914) (0.916) (0.059) (0.076) (0.450) (0.431) (0.054) (0.051) (0.454) (0.450) 
unemployed -0.554 -0.555 -0.042 -0.041 0.284 0.285 0.163 0.162 -0.096 -0.095 
 
(0.202) (0.203) (0.867) (0.869) (0.341) (0.341) (0.109) (0.111) (0.448) (0.451) 
householdincome -0.135 -0.135 0.020 0.022 0.050 0.049 0.006 0.006 -0.021 -0.021 
 
(0.238) (0.238) (0.737) (0.717) (0.444) (0.456) (0.799) (0.790) (0.440) (0.436) 
nperhousehold 0.051 0.051 -0.055 -0.056 0.245** 0.245** -0.075* -0.076* -0.052 -0.052 
 
(0.744) (0.744) (0.632) (0.625) (0.025) (0.024) (0.070) (0.070) (0.208) (0.207) 
education 0.073 0.073 0.066 0.066 -0.099 -0.099 0.001 0.001 0.013 0.013 
 
(0.534) (0.534) (0.389) (0.392) (0.141) (0.143) (0.965) (0.967) (0.630) (0.631) 
risk1 -0.411 -0.412 -0.071 -0.084 1.109*** 1.116*** -0.068 -0.068 -0.381** -0.380** 
 
(0.449) (0.448) (0.821) (0.788) (0.003) (0.003) (0.604) (0.600) (0.017) (0.017) 
risk2 0.787* 0.788* -0.070 -0.048 -0.067 -0.077 0.179* 0.181* -0.099 -0.100 
 
(0.059) (0.060) (0.797) (0.858) (0.834) (0.808) (0.095) (0.090) (0.358) (0.354) 
risk3 2.090*** 2.092*** 1.138*** 1.183*** -0.665 -0.687 0.781*** 0.786*** 0.530*** 0.528*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.228) (0.216) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.006) 
cogn skills -0.126 -0.126 -0.050 -0.042 0.227** 0.223** 0.019 0.020 0.107** 0.106** 
 
(0.490) (0.491) (0.607) (0.667) (0.038) (0.044) (0.663) (0.647) (0.012) (0.012) 
impatience -0.093 -0.093 -0.063 -0.064 0.099** 0.100** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.259) (0.259) (0.108) (0.101) (0.032) (0.031) (0.955) (0.949) (0.972) (0.974) 
constant 6.955*** 7.304 10.782*** 19.662*** 3.379** -1.020 0.642 1.376 0.269 -0.213 
 
(0.002) (0.306) (0.000) (0.000) (0.035) (0.850) (0.265) (0.461) (0.669) (0.919) 
adj/pseudo R2     0.034 0.034 0.041 0.041 0.087 0.087 
log likelihood -2018.881 -2018.880 -1873.157 -1870.862   -435.996 -435.916 -410.844 -410.810 
F/chi2 3.06*** 3.09*** 2.00*** 2.10*** 2.18*** 2.11*** 62.98*** 70.60*** 96.99*** 97.44*** 
N 753 753 753 753 753 
 
 
Table A4. City sample 
 
Notes: Dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). Robust standard errors are 
clustered on interviewers (108 groups). All regressions control for order effects. P-values in parentheses. * p-value< .1 , ** p-value< .05 , *** p-value< .01 
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DG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
           BMI 0.005 -0.160 0.019 0.115 0.033 0.419 -0.012 -0.067 0.036 0.143 
 
(0.927) (0.750) (0.345) (0.506) (0.452) (0.345) (0.529) (0.722) (0.114) (0.461) 
BMIsq
 
0.004 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.008 
 
0.001 
 
-0.002 
  
(0.740) 
 
(0.562) 
 
(0.384) 
 
(0.770) 
 
(0.574) 
gender(male) -0.216 -0.198 -0.097 -0.107 -0.062 -0.104 0.128 0.135 -0.043 -0.054 
 
(0.525) (0.565) (0.489) (0.443) (0.820) (0.710) (0.289) (0.270) (0.737) (0.678) 
age -0.950 -0.944 -0.008 -0.010 -0.730 -0.741 0.214 0.215 -0.556 -0.57 
 
(0.175) (0.177) (0.973) (0.964) (0.214) (0.208) (0.375) (0.372) (0.272) (0.266) 
agesq 0.024 0.024 0.000 0.001 0.016 0.017 -0.004 -0.004 0.013 0.013 
 
(0.127) (0.129) (0.924) (0.911) (0.206) (0.199) (0.448) (0.444) (0.277) (0.271) 
unemployed 0.721 0.722 -0.282 -0.281 0.443 0.445 -0.142 -0.142 0.053 0.052 
 
(0.396) (0.395) (0.449) (0.450) (0.517) (0.515) (0.625) (0.624) (0.862) (0.863) 
householdincome 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.368) (0.383) (0.772) (0.755) (0.408) (0.377) (0.147) (0.141) (0.928) 0.957 
nperhousehold -0.128 -0.127 -0.052 -0.052 0.225* 0.223* -0.020 -0.020 0.042 0.041 
 
(0.459) (0.461) (0.441) (0.438) (0.083) (0.087) (0.721) (0.722) (0.488) (0.498) 
risk1 0.812* 0.808* -0.088 -0.086 0.546 0.555 0.505*** 0.504*** 0.124 0.126 
 (0.079) (0.080) (0.696) (0.702) (0.165) (0.159) (0.009) (0.009) (0.527) (0.521) 
risk2 -0.457 -0.453 -0.128 -0.130 -0.018 -0.023 0.034 0.034 -0.273** -0.276** 
 
(0.160) (0.162) (0.379) (0.374) (0.948) (0.932) (0.779) (0.775) (0.033) (0.031) 
risk3 0.594 0.598 -0.274 -0.277 -0.210 -0.221 0.256 0.257 -0.136 -0.138 
 
(0.147) (0.144) (0.339) (0.334) (0.600) (0.582) (0.150) (0.148) (0.425) (0.421) 
cogn skills 0.056 0.052 0.120 0.123 -0.187 -0.178 -0.039 -0.040 0.190** 0.193** 
 
(0.790) (0.806) (0.113) (0.106) (0.259) (0.287) (0.594) (0.584) (0.013) (0.012) 
impatience 0.092 0.091 0.038 0.039 0.067 0.069 0.010 0.010 -0.022 -0.022 
 (0.186) (0.188) (0.258) (0.251) (0.246) (0.232) (0.672) (0.673) (0.379) (0.385) 
constant 17.265** 19.115* 9.348*** 8.283** 11.866* 7.583 -1.574 -0.957 5.468 4.401 
 
(0.027) (0.053) (0.001) (0.013) (0.076) (0.374) (0.563) (0.780) (0.310) (0.442) 
adj/pseudo R2     0.036 0.036 0.046 0.046 0.056 0.057 
log likelihood -1592.178 -1592.126 -1183.893 -1183.810   -359.605 -359.564 -298.628 -298.510 
F/chi2 2.15*** 2.10*** 79.03*** 78.19*** 47.91*** 46.49*** 36.96* 37.25 31.75 31.91 
N 618 618 618 618 618 
           
      
 
 
 
Table A5. Lab sample 
 
Notes: Dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the individual level. All regressions control for order effects. P-values in parentheses. * p-value< .1 , ** p-value< .05, *** p-value< .01 
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DG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
           BMI 0.089* 0.033 0.007 -0.654* 0.008 0.325 -0.006 -0.021 0.012 0.132 
 
(0.077) (0.955) (0.834) (0.089) (0.852) (0.415) (0.654) (0.882) (0.355) (0.325) 
BMIsq
 
0.001 
 
0.013* 
 
-0.006 
 
0.000 
 
-0.002 
  
(0.924) 
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.431) 
 
(0.914) 
 
(0.372) 
constant 5.357*** 6.049 9.137*** 17.323*** 6.850*** 2.921 0.688** 0.877 0.273 -1.205 
 
(0.000) (0.408) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.553) (0.031) (0.624) (0.389) (0.471) 
adj/pseudo R2     0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
log likelihood -2054.998 -2054.993 -1892.689 -1890.707   -454.771 -454.765 -449.937 -449.571 
F/chi2 3.14* 1.58 0.04 1.47 0.03 0.36 0.20 0.21 0.85 1.78 
controls NO NO NO NO NO 
N 753 753 753 753 753 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
           BMI 0.023 -0.218 0.016 0.059 0.004 0.174 -0.005 0.066 0.027 0.047 
 
(0.637) (0.658) (0.402) (0.767) (0.927) (0.654) (0.774) (0.710) (0.170) (0.806) 
BMIsq
 
0.005 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.002 
 
0.000 
  
(0.619) 
 
(0.823) 
 
(0.656) 
 
(0.687) 
 
(0.917) 
constant 7.611*** 10.357* 9.160*** 8.681*** 5.947*** 3.999 0.640 -0.167 0.215 -0.006 
 
(0.000) (0.072) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.377) (0.110) (0.935) (0.622) (0.998) 
adj/pseudo R2     0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 
log likelihood -1611.732 -1611.622 -1202.659 -1202.643   -377.132 -377.056 -315.633 -315.629 
F/chi2 0.22 0.27 0.70 0.37 0.01 0.10 0.08 0.25 1.89 1.91 
Controls NO NO NO NO NO 
N 618 618 618 618 618 
 
  
Table A7. Lab sample 
 
Notes: Dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level. P-values in parentheses. * p-value< .1 , ** p-value< .05, *** p-value< .01 
 
Notes: Dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). 
Robust standard errors are clustered on interviewers (108 groups). P-values in parentheses. * p-value< .1 , ** p-value< .05, *** p-value< .01 
 
Table A6. City sample 
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  DG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      obese -0.050 0.142 0.236 -0.096 -0.343*   
 
(0.945) (0.746) (0.654) (0.615) (0.090) 
overweight -0.721 -0.152 -0.188 -0.037 -0.093 
  (0.110) (0.625) (0.567) (0.767) (0.504) 
gender(male) -0.326 0.038 -0.194 -0.096 0.081 
 
(0.417) (0.871) (0.425) (0.314) (0.486) 
age 0.013 -0.025 0.127*** 0.005 0.009 
 
(0.875) (0.639) (0.003) (0.805) (0.667) 
agesq 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.962) (0.675) (0.010) (0.774) (0.952) 
married 1.168* 0.285 -1.347*** 0.254 0.140 
 
(0.083) (0.475) (0.006) (0.133) (0.458) 
divorced 2.095*** 0.223 -0.990 -0.072 0.264 
 
(0.008) (0.757) (0.218) (0.797) (0.392) 
widow 0.034 0.223 0.464 0.202 0.418 
 
(0.975) (0.724) (0.529) (0.493) (0.268) 
cohabiting -0.112 -0.858* -0.541 0.471* -0.224 
 
(0.928) (0.058) (0.439) (0.055) (0.469) 
unemployed -0.575 -0.050 0.275 0.162 -0.097 
 
(0.186) (0.840) (0.356) (0.114) (0.445) 
householdincome -0.137 0.021 0.051 0.006 -0.022 
 
(0.232) (0.728) (0.435) (0.792) (0.417) 
nperhousehold 0.052 -0.054 0.247** -0.076* -0.055 
 
(0.740) (0.642) (0.025) (0.069) (0.185) 
education 0.065 0.066 -0.099 0.001 0.012 
 
(0.581) (0.390) (0.137) (0.966) (0.670) 
risk1 -0.386 -0.084 1.093*** -0.069 -0.375**  
 
(0.479) (0.788) (0.003) (0.598) (0.019) 
risk2 0.771* -0.062 -0.056 0.179* -0.107 
 
(0.066) (0.819) (0.859) (0.093) (0.327) 
risk3 2.127*** 1.145*** -0.654 0.778*** 0.529*** 
 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.231) (0.000) (0.005) 
cogn skills -0.123 -0.049 0.229** 0.019 0.104**  
 
(0.506) (0.620) (0.035) (0.671) (0.014) 
impatience -0.098 -0.064 0.098** -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.235) (0.104) (0.035) (0.962) (0.966) 
constant 7.304*** 10.593*** 3.179*** 0.480 0.049 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.335) (0.925) 
adj/pseudo R2   0.034 0.041 0.090 
log likelihood -2017.622 -1872.913  -435.989 -409.626 
F/chi2 3.08*** 2.11*** 2.21*** 66.36*** 98.68*** 
N 753 753 753 753 753 
Table A8. City sample 
 
Notes: Dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). 
Robust standard errors are clustered on interviewers (108 groups). All regressions control for order effects. P-values in parentheses. * p-value< .1 ,  
** p-value< .05 , *** p-value< .01 . Descriptive statistics: a.) Obese: x̄: 0.087 SD: 0.282 Min: 0 Max: 1   b.) Overweight:  x̄: 0.266 SD: 0.442 Min: 0 Max: 1 
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  DG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      obese 0.112 -0.019 -0.088 0.041 0.551 
 
(0.917) (0.938) (0.917) (0.925) (0.254) 
overweight 0.304 0.126 0.549 -0.175 0.338 
  (0.495) (0.455) (0.113) (0.297) (0.105) 
gender(male) -0.226 -0.077 -0.046 0.121 -0.009 
 
(0.497) (0.583) (0.862) (0.308) (0.942) 
age -0.912 0.015 -0.643 0.185 -0.521 
 
(0.194) (0.948) (0.278) (0.447) (0.299) 
agesq 0.023 0.000 0.014 -0.003 0.012 
 
(0.144) (0.996) (0.272) (0.530) (0.304) 
unemployed 0.737 -0.282 0.460 -0.146 0.046 
 
(0.385) (0.446) (0.504) (0.614) (0.880) 
householdincome 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.389) (0.775) (0.442) (0.160) (0.853) 
nperhousehold -0.128 -0.049 0.228* -0.021 0.045 
 
(0.456) (0.459) (0.079) (0.704) (0.451) 
risk1 0.833* -0.089 0.570 0.498** 0.127 
 
(0.070) (0.692) (0.149) (0.010) (0.515) 
risk2 -0.457 -0.125 -0.012 0.032 -0.269**  
 
(0.160) (0.390) (0.964) (0.788) (0.035) 
risk3 0.607 -0.276 -0.202 0.253 -0.126 
 
(0.139) (0.335) (0.614) (0.156) (0.464) 
cogn skills 0.056 0.119 -0.187 -0.038 0.186**  
 
(0.791) (0.117) (0.261) (0.601) (0.015) 
impatience 0.092 0.038 0.067 0.010 -0.022 
  (0.185) (0.261) (0.244) (0.673) (0.390) 
constant 16.916** 9.467*** 11.552* -1.474 5.816 
  (0.030) (0.001) (0.087) (0.589) (0.273) 
adj/pseudo R2   0.037 0.047 0.058 
log likelihood -1591.974 -1184.030  -359.267 -410.884 
F/chi2 2.09*** 79.27*** 47.13*** 36.96 35.64 
N 618 618 618 618 618 
Notes: Dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model 
(3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level. All regressions control 
for order effects. P-values in parentheses. * p-value< .1 , ** p-value< .05 , *** p-value< .01 . Descriptive statistics:  
a.) Obese: x̄: 0.017 SD: 0.132 Min:  0 Max: 1      b.) Overweight:  x̄: 0.118 SD: 0.323 Min: 0 Max: 1 
Table A9. Lab sample 
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  DG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
           BF% 0.011 0.040 -0.013 -0.084 0.002 0.169 -0.005 -0.043 -0.008 -0.032 
 
(0.767) (0.793) (0.595) (0.424) (0.947) (0.102) (0.599) (0.282) (0.526) (0.435) 
BF%sq 
 
-0.001 
 
0.001 
 
-0.003* 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
  
 
(0.836) 
 
(0.481) 
 
(0.095) 
 
(0.326) 
 
(0.523) 
gender(male) -0.331 -0.319 -0.091 -0.120 -0.193 -0.125 -0.154 -0.168 -0.017 -0.027 
 
(0.526) (0.553) (0.747) (0.676) (0.601) (0.735) (0.263) (0.220) (0.915) (0.866) 
age 0.003 0.001 -0.022 -0.016 0.124*** 0.109** 0.007 0.010 0.012 0.015 
 
(0.969) (0.992) (0.677) (0.759) (0.004) (0.012) (0.751) (0.637) (0.556) (0.493) 
agesq 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001** -0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.996) (0.972) (0.679) (0.760) (0.011) (0.030) (0.742) (0.620) (0.835) (0.751) 
married 1.062 1.068 0.310 0.293 -1.352*** -1.313*** 0.254 0.244 0.111 0.102 
 
(0.120) (0.120) (0.435) (0.462) (0.006) (0.007) (0.124) (0.142) (0.561) (0.589) 
divorced 2.102*** 2.103*** 0.246 0.240 -0.977 -0.962 -0.072 -0.073 0.245 0.243 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.734) (0.742) (0.225) (0.231) (0.795) (0.792) (0.429) (0.430) 
widow -0.089 -0.065 0.236 0.179 0.436 0.569 0.211 0.176 0.426 0.402 
 
(0.935) (0.954) (0.709) (0.787) (0.558) (0.442) (0.467) (0.547) (0.259) (0.274) 
cohabiting -0.135 -0.139 -0.833* -0.827* -0.538 -0.553 0.473* 0.478* -0.232 -0.230 
 
(0.911) (0.908) (0.064) (0.066) (0.442) (0.435) (0.053) (0.050) (0.456) (0.460) 
unemployed -0.555 -0.541 -0.040 -0.070 0.283 0.354 0.163 0.146 -0.096 -0.106 
 
(0.202) (0.215) (0.873) (0.777) (0.344) (0.242) (0.110) (0.164) (0.446) (0.416) 
householdincome -0.135 -0.134 0.019 0.016 0.051 0.059 0.006 0.004 -0.021 -0.022 
 
(0.238) (0.239) (0.748) (0.789) (0.440) (0.378) (0.800) (0.866) (0.443) (0.425) 
nperhousehold 0.051 0.049 -0.055 -0.049 0.245** 0.231** -0.075* -0.072* -0.052 -0.050 
 
(0.744) (0.752) (0.632) (0.660) (0.025) (0.032) (0.071) (0.091) (0.209) (0.235) 
education 0.073 0.071 0.065 0.069 -0.098 -0.109 0.001 0.004 0.013 0.015 
 
(0.533) (0.548) (0.396) (0.370) (0.143) (0.103) (0.963) (0.891) (0.627) (0.594) 
risk1 -0.413 -0.410 -0.063 -0.066 1.103*** 1.112*** -0.068 -0.071 -0.382** -0.385** 
 
(0.447) (0.453) (0.842) (0.833) (0.003) (0.002) (0.602) (0.585) (0.016) (0.016) 
risk2 0.788* 0.787* -0.074 -0.070 -0.063 -0.073 0.179* 0.181* -0.098 -0.096 
 
(0.059) (0.060) (0.784) (0.794) (0.842) (0.816) (0.094) (0.089) (0.361) (0.371) 
risk3 2.088*** 2.083*** 1.141*** 1.154*** -0.666 -0.695 0.782*** 0.788*** 0.531*** 0.538*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.228) (0.210) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005) 
cogn skills -0.126 -0.126 -0.050 -0.051 0.227** 0.229** 0.019 0.019 0.107** 0.107** 
 
(0.490) (0.491) (0.607) (0.599) (0.038) (0.035) (0.662) (0.667) (0.012) (0.012) 
impatience -0.092 -0.093 -0.064 -0.062 0.100** 0.096** -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 
(0.260) (0.257) (0.105) (0.116) (0.032) (0.040) (0.955) (0.988) (0.973) (0.992) 
constant 6.986*** 6.634** 10.917*** 11.741*** 3.226** 1.340 0.595 1.038 0.180 0.465 
  (0.001) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.427) (0.263) (0.119) (0.757) (0.532) 
adj/pseudo R2     0.034 0.037 0.041 0.042 0.087 0.088 
log likelihood -2018.869 -2018.846 -1873.047 -1872.686   -435.999 -435.475 -410.884 -410.664 
F/chi2 3.07*** 2.98*** 1.95*** 1.91*** 2.19*** 2.53*** 63.02*** 66.11*** 97.01*** 99.45*** 
N 753 753 753 753 753 
 
Table A10. City sample 
 
Notes: Dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). Robust standard errors are clustered on 
interviewers (108 groups). All regressions control for order effects. P-values in parentheses. * p-value< .1 , ** p-value< .05 , *** p-value< .01 . BF% was calculated using the following formula: BF% 
= –44.988 + (0.503 x age) + (10.689 x sex) + (3.172 x BMI) – (0.026 x BMIsq) + (0.181 x BMI x sex) – (0.02 x BMI x age) – (0.005 x BMIsq x sex) + (0.00021 x BMIsq x age) where male = 0 and 
female = 1 for sex, and age in years. Descriptive statistics: BF%: x̄: 27.94 SD: 8.20 Min:  6.98 Max: 50.08 
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  DG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
           BF% 0.001 -0.071 0.011 -0.02 0.021 0.118 -0.007 -0.020 0.021 0.072*   
 
(0.967) (0.533) (0.347) (0.666) (0.397) (0.212) (0.515) (0.632) (0.104) (0.095) 
BF%sq 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
0.000 
 
-0.001 
    (0.485)   (0.442)   (0.288)   (0.753)   (0.226) 
gender(male) -0.197 -0.279 0.039 0.005 0.185 0.293 0.042 0.028 0.210 0.273 
 
(0.652) (0.550) (0.834) (0.982) (0.596) (0.408) (0.790) (0.867) (0.223) (0.127) 
age -0.949 -0.944 -0.011 -0.009 -0.738 -0.744 0.216 0.216 -0.565 -0.627 
 
(0.175) (0.176) (0.961) (0.968) (0.209) (0.205) (0.370) (0.368) (0.266) (0.241) 
agesq 0.024 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.017 -0.004 -0.004 0.013 0.015 
  (0.127) (0.127) (0.917) (0.920) (0.204) (0.202) (0.445) (0.445) (0.274) (0.251) 
unemployed 0.719 0.699 -0.281 -0.291 0.445 0.474 -0.142 -0.144 0.053 0.066 
 
(0.397) (0.411) (0.450) (0.436) (0.515) (0.489) (0.625) (0.620) (0.861) (0.827) 
householdincome 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.366) (0.381) (0.770) (0.786) (0.408) (0.385) (0.147) (0.142) (0.935) (0.994) 
nperhousehold -0.127 -0.127 -0.052 -0.051 0.224* 0.223* -0.020 -0.020 0.042 0.040 
 
(0.460) (0.462) (0.441) (0.442) (0.084) (0.084) (0.722) (0.724) (0.492) (0.504) 
risk1 0.810* 0.798* -0.088 -0.093 0.548 0.564 0.505*** 0.502*** 0.125 0.135 
 
(0.079) (0.084) (0.697) (0.682) (0.163) (0.153) (0.009) (0.010) (0.524) (0.496) 
risk2 -0.456 -0.471 -0.128 -0.136 -0.018 0.004 0.034 0.032 -0.274**  -0.269**  
 
(0.160) (0.150) (0.379) (0.354) (0.946) (0.989) (0.778) (0.793) (0.032) (0.036) 
risk3 0.594 0.591 -0.274 -0.275 -0.210 -0.208 0.256 0.255 -0.137 -0.136 
 
(0.148) (0.149) (0.339) (0.338 (0.600) (0.605) (0.150) (0.151) (0.424) (0.426) 
cogn skills 0.056 0.050 0.121 0.119 -0.186 -0.179 -0.039 -0.040 0.191**  0.196**  
 
(0.791) (0.812) (0.112) (0.120) (0.262) (0.281) (0.593) (0.585) (0.013) (0.010) 
impatience 0.092 0.093 0.038 0.039 0.067 0.065 0.010 0.010 -0.022 -0.024 
 
(0.186) (0.179) (0.257) (0.250) (0.244) (0.256) (0.672) (0.666) (0.380) (0.353) 
constant 17.331** 18.137** 9.516*** 9.853*** 12.127* 11.142* -1.677 -1.526 5.809 5.861 
  (0.026) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.069) (0.098) (0.536) (0.577) (0.280) (0.295) 
adj/pseudo R2     0.036 0.036 0.046 0.046 0.056 0.059 
log likelihood -1592.181 -1591.976 -1183.882 -1183.695   -359.593 -359.548 -298.567 -297.918 
F/chi2 2.15*** 2.07*** 78.76*** 78.29*** 47.99*** 1.84 37.00* 37.23 31.74 34.11 
N 618 618 618 618 618 
 
 
Table A11. Lab sample 
 
Notes: Dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the individual level. All regressions control for order effects. P-values in parentheses. * p-value< .1 , ** p-value< .05 , *** p-value< .01 . BF% was calculated using 
the following formula: BF% = –44.988 + (0.503 x age) + (10.689 x sex) + (3.172 x BMI) – (0.026 x BMIsq) + (0.181 x BMI x sex) – (0.02 x BMI x age) – (0.005 x BMIsq x sex) + 
(0.00021 x BMIsq x age) where male = 0 and female = 1 for sex, and age in years. Descriptive statistics: BF%: x̄: 21.84 SD: 6.84 Min:  1.98 Max: 45.75       
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Appendix figures 
 
Figure A1. Distribution of game variables 
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